Editor’s Note: The following is the English translation of an article published on March 28, in Armenian, in “Aztag,” Asbarez’s sister publication in Beirut, Lebanon.
BY DR. KEVORK HAGOPJIAN, ESQ.
The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu is not merely another episode in Turkey’s long history of political repression—it marks a turning point, emblematic of the country’s deepening authoritarianism and its entanglement with serious economic, financial, security, and geopolitical crises.
As of now, more than 1,500 individuals have been arrested during mass protests. Government officials, including President Erdoğan, have characterized these demonstrations as “street terrorism” and “theatrical show,” while the opposition describes the movement as the latest wave of resistance to restore democracy.
The annulment of Imamoğlu’s university diploma—required to run for the presidency—demonstrates that the ruling regime is not merely suppressing political competition or neutralizing alternatives; but it has also abandoned even the most basic principles of democracy. The judiciary has become a political weapon, while public spaces and social media networks have been transformed into tools of surveillance and intimidation.
Despite his detention, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) nominated Imamoğlu as its presidential candidate. This decision galvanized thousands of supporters, with over 14 million people participating in the party’s election process—a clear sign of broad popular backing. This nomination constitutes a critical moment for the opposition.
In this context, Turkey’s Kurdish population once again finds itself marginalized. The so-called “peace process,” which had lingered in limbo for years, is now more threatened than ever. The Turkish state—including the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Erdoğan’s ultra-nationalist ally—demands that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) dissolve itself, not as part of a negotiated process, but as a precondition to prevent further repression. Put simply, this demand is articulated through military and security rhetoric, not political or diplomatic language. The government has made no commitment to guarantee political, civil, or cultural rights to the Kurds—nor to grant any form of territorial or cultural autonomy as a reciprocal step to Kurdish demands.
Moreover, the purported message from PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan lacks transparency and legal legitimacy. Öcalan has been in complete isolation since 2019, with no confirmed or direct communication with Kurdish society. The supposed “statement,” dated February 27, was disseminated through state channels rather than through his legal representatives or a neutral platform. The recent cancellation of a scheduled visit by a delegation from the left-wing Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) to meet Öcalan ahead of the Kurdish New Year, Newroz, underscores the extent to which the state controls public narratives and has no real interest in fostering constructive dialogue.
When “peace” is imposed without equal and fair participation from all parties, and in the absence of transparency, it becomes a tool of state coercion and control—rather than a foundation for sustainable and lasting reconciliation. Without questioning the legitimacy or the merit of the matter, calling for the dissolution of the PKK without introducing meaningful political reforms is not a peace initiative; it is a demand for subjugation under duress. Thus, what is being offered is not a peace process, but a dangerous illusion that risks exacerbating regional instability and fueling underground resistance or heightened internal conflict.
It is particularly telling that, while Turkey is engulfed in domestic turmoil, it continues to present itself to the outside world as a proponent of normalization and reconciliation with Armenia. For example, on March 26, the newly appointed Turkish general consul in Aleppo visited the Armenian Consulate and met with the Armenian consul—an event that was publicly reported to signal progress in the normalization process. Organizing such a meeting in Aleppo also carries symbolic and historical weight, perhaps even aimed at gauging the pulse of the traditional Armenian diaspora on this process.
Recently, with funding from Armenia’s state budget—but clearly with Turkish government approval—a delegation of Turkish journalists visited Yerevan under the pretense of “building a media bridge.” At least one of these journalists, upon return, published content featuring anti-Armenian, denialist, and pan-Turkic rhetoric. Some even openly supported Azerbaijan’s actions, denied the Armenian Genocide, and rejected its consequences—attempting to erase the memory of historical justice.
In the same context, a humanitarian gesture led to the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Turkey from March 21 to 31, to facilitate aid shipments from Armenia to Syria. This was only the second time the border—closed unilaterally by Turkey in 1993—was temporarily reopened. The first instance occurred in February 2023 following the devastating earthquake in Turkey and Syria. While this temporary opening demonstrates the potential for cooperation during times of crisis between the two countries, the continued closure of the border remains a stark reminder of Armenia’s ongoing blockade.
All of this underscores the deep fissures in what is often referred to as the “normalization” process between Turkey and Armenia. Meaningful progress in Armenian-Turkish relations can only occur if the Turkish government renounces authoritarianism and expansionist pan-Turkic policies, lifts the blockade of Armenia, and assumes responsibility for its direct and active role—especially over the past five years—in the forced displacement and genocidal acts against the indigenous population of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). Turkey must also acknowledge historical truths.
Although recognition of the 1915–1923 Armenian Genocide and eliminating its consequences has not been a precondition set by Armenia for normalization over the past decades—and arguably should not be one now, it must nonetheless be clearly understood that stable and enduring peace and reconciliation in Armenian-Turkish relations are unattainable without addressing and eliminating the consequences of the 1915 genocide at a national and societal level in Turkey. Otherwise, the term “normalization” is nothing more than a diplomatic smokescreen—one that deepens the divide and antagonism between the two states and peoples.
No matter how much Armenia’s current leadership attempts to appease Turkey or meet its anti-Armenian demands, the escalating internal tensions following Imamoğlu’s arrest signal that Ankara has not chosen the path of peace and stability, but one of internal and regional destabilization. This casts serious doubt on the credibility of the Armenia-Turkey normalization process.
Dr. Kevork Hagopjian, Esq. is an attorney and human rights advocate with expertise in international law, minority rights, civil litigation, and community engagement. He holds a Ph.D. in Law from the University of Vienna, along with two LL.M. degrees in Public International Law from SOAS, University of London and U.S. Law from George Mason University as well as an LL.B. from University of Aleppo. His doctoral research led to the publication of a book on “The Rights of Armenian Minorities in Lebanon and Turkey Under National and International Law.” In addition to legal practice, he facilitates dialogue and peace-building efforts in divided or post-conflict communities.
